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The 2017 General Election in
Scotland: a Return to Multi-party
Politics?
Les Elections législatives de 2017 en Ecosse : retour vers un système
multipartite ?
Fiona Simpkins
 
Introduction
1 Although Scotland was for many years a Labour stronghold, devolution and the creation
of a Scottish Parliament in 1999 initially appeared to usher in a multi-party political
system. Until then, the Scottish party system, bolstered by the first past the post method,
had often been considered as a dominant-party system, as opposed to the UK’s two-party
system: until the general elections of 2015, the Scottish Labour party had been the first
party in Scotland in terms of seats since 1959 and in terms of votes since 1964. It seemed
at first that devolution would not erode Labour’s domination in Scotland as the party won
56 seats (as opposed to the SNP’s 35 seats) in 1999 and 50 seats (compared to the SNP’s 27
seats) in 2003. Yet, the fact that Labour was unable to obtain a majority at either one of
those  elections  and  had  to  form  coalition  governments  with  the  Scottish  Liberal-
Democrats effectively moved Scotland’s new political landscape closer to that of a multi-
party system, according to the definition of Giovanni Sartori,1 in which several political
parties have the capacity to gain control of governmental power, either separately or in a
coalition. Indeed, devolution saw the emergence of the Scottish Greens and the Scottish
Socialist Party which each won a seat in 1999, and won 7 seats and 6 seats respectively in
the Scottish Parliament  elections  of  2003.  Up to  six  parties  were represented in  the
Scottish Parliament,  most  of  which parties  of  the  left  and centre-left,  with only  the
Conservatives standing to the right of the political spectrum.
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2 Yet  it  soon  became  evident  that  devolution  served  as  a  political  platform  for  the
nationalists who, as Scotland’s only mainstream party with no British counterpart, were
better able to appeal to a wider electorate keen to protect Scotland’s distinctive interests
in Scotland’s  own political  arena,  as  opposed to Westminster  where it  was generally
considered that Scottish MPs did not have a significant voice and where wider British
interests were believed to prevail. The 2007 Scottish Parliament election thus returned an
SNP minority government for the first time, after which the nationalists were then able
to win an overall majority in the 2011 Scottish Parliament election in spite of a semi-
proportional electoral system explicitly designed to prevent such an outcome. Although
the nationalists were unable to translate their growing electoral success into a Yes vote at
the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, the latter nevertheless bolstered rather than
weakened the pro-independence movement in Scotland.  The SNP became the largest
party of  Scotland in terms of  membership and the third largest  in the UK,  with the
number of SNP members surging to more than 120.000. The continuous decline of the
Labour  party,  whose  image  further  suffered  during  the  independence  referendum
campaign due not only to negative campaigning but also to its shared political platform
with the Conservatives, also meant that the SNP faced fewer challengers in Scotland’s
post-devolution political landscape. The SNP was able to win 56 out of 59 Scottish seats at
the 2015 general  election and assert its  domination of  Scottish politics.  Scotland had
again become a dominant party polity, albeit this time with the nationalists in power.
3 However,  the June 2017 general  election appears  to  have seriously  dented the SNP’s
electoral  prospects  and  has  corresponded not  only  to  the  unexpected  resurgence  of
Conservatism in Scotland but also to a new surge in Labour votes. Against all odds, the
SNP lost 21 seats and 13.1% of the vote with some safe seats such as those of Alex Salmond
or Angus Robertson falling to the hands of the Scottish Conservatives. The Conservatives,
on the other hand, increased their share of the vote by 13.7% and gained 12 seats, all of
which from the SNP. Significantly, Scottish Labour also increased its share of the vote by
2.8% and won six extra seats. This suggests that there has been a disruption in Scottish
politics  and  that  the  debate  which  was  heretofore  polarised  on  each  side  of  the
constitutional issue within a wide centre-left consensus, has become more complex. It
appears evident that the Brexit vote following the European referendum of June 2016,
which has dominated the British political debate since then, has had a profound impact
on Scottish politics. This paper therefore seeks to examine Scotland’s return to multi-
party politics in light of the twin impact of Brexit and the constitutional issue on the 2017
general election results in Scotland.
 
From Labour stronghold to SNP territory
4 Until the introduction of devolution in 1999, Scotland was widely considered as a Labour
stronghold. The Scottish Labour party has deep roots in Scotland’s radical history and its
origins lay with the party founded by Keir Hardie and Robert Cunningham-Graham in
1888. It was able to draw much of its support in Scotland through the period of mass
industrial unrest referred to as Red Clydeside, the anti-war movement and the Glasgow
rent  strikes  which contributed to the development of  the labour movement and the
radicalisation of the Scottish working class.2 This radical past was later refuelled in the
1980s and 1990s with anti-Thatcherism, the anti-poll tax civil disobedience movement
and  the  pro-devolutionist  movement  which  continued  to  feed  the  idea  of  a  more
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collectivist, egalitarian and radical Scottish political landscape which the Scottish Labour
Party was heretofore able to draw upon to present itself  as the party that spoke for
Scotland and to establish itself until  the mid-2000s as the dominant force in Scottish
politics. 
5 However, the Scottish Labour Party has long suffered from structural weaknesses which
have  become  particularly  acute  under  devolution.3 Although  the  Labour  Party  was
initially organised as a conglomerate of affiliated bodies, it became a centralised body
after the 1918 party conference when it adopted a national membership scheme and a
constitutional  framework  for  a  network  of  constituency  and  branch  parties  which
operated  more  as  branches  of  the  central  office  in  the  regions  rather  than  actual
autonomous  regional  offices.  In  Scotland,  its  unitary  structure  was  until  recently
alleviated by the key role played by its affiliated trade unions in policy-making, as well as
candidate  selection,  leadership  recruitment,  campaigning  and,  more  importantly,
funding. Indeed, it proved to be particularly important in the case of Scottish Labour as
the Scottish Trades Union Congress is not a regional branch of the Trades Union Congress
but an entirely autonomous body. Yet, with the decline of union members in recent years,
the Scottish party  has  become overwhelmingly  dependent  on funds  allocated by the
central party organization.4
6 Another weakness of the Scottish Labour Party has been its low membership, which is
particularly  striking  if  one  is  to  contrast  it  with  its  past  political  strengths.  Labour
membership has been consistently lower than anywhere else in Britain since the 1950s :5
this  suggests  that  the  mobilisation  of  ground  troops  for  electoral  canvassing  and
campaigning often ran thin. For many years, Scottish Labour may have underestimated
the extent to which its electoral strength was due to the first past the post system and
overlooked  the  key  electoral  functions  of  local  parties  whose  role  in  information
dissemination,  electoral  targeting  and voter  mobilisation  have  a  strong  impact  on
electoral performance.6 Scottish Labour’s low membership levels therefore constitute a
structural weakness which can become especially relevant when it is in a challenging
electoral position such as is currently the case, faced with the threat of particularly high
mobilisation rates among nationalist members and supporters across Scotland. The SNP is
the third political party in the UK today in terms of membership7 and has attracted the
support  of  many  volunteers,  groups  and  organisations  during  the  independence
referendum campaign, which it is able to mobilise ahead of elections to influence the
vote. 
7 Significantly, devolution also challenged the territorial cohesion of the Labour party. The
first test of Scottish Labour’s strength in Scotland came with the introduction of the
Additional Member System for Scottish Parliament elections: not only did Scottish Labour
lose its electoral dominance, but the first two coalition governments of 1999 and 2003
under  the  Scottish  Labour  party  and the  Scottish  Liberal  Democrats  meant  that  the
former had to find agreements with their partners in government and that some of the
policies  that  were  considered  unpalatable  to  the  Parliamentary  Labour  Party  were
effectively introduced in Scotland.8 Indeed, it pointed to another inherent weakness of
the Scottish Labour party as it had to choose between the cohesive electoral message of
the party as a whole and its own electoral priorities in a different political landscape.
Unsurprisingly, there have been increasing calls for reforms to make the Scottish party
more autonomous and shed its image of a “branch office”,9 many of which having been
recently introduced under former leader Kezia Dugdale.10 
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8 Although these changes would appear to go in the right  direction,  Scottish Labour’s
position on the political spectrum in Scotland’s devolved political environment has also
proved  to  be  particularly  problematic.  While  its  UK  counterpart  has  faced  little
competition to the left, Scottish Labour has had to contend with several left and centre-
left parties, with few differences to be found between Labour and the SNP, for instance,
on a wide set of issues. In Scotland, Labour now has to contend with a new left-wing
party, RISE, which was formed out of the union of several radical movements active in the
independence referendum campaign, as well as the Scottish Greens. 
9 Moreover, the core issue of Scotland’s constitutional future and the radical character of
the pro-independence movement during the referendum debate in Scotland has acted as
a substitute to the kind of radicalism that has attracted young activists back to Labour
elsewhere in Britain, notably through the student fees protests south of the border or the
pro-Corbyn activist movement Momentum. In a nation where there are no student fees,
the political awakening of young voters came not with the fees movement but with the
independence  campaign.11 This  means  that  Scottish  Labour  failed  to  renew  its
membership and voter bases as the young radical vote in Scotland now defected to pro-
independence parties, not least to the SNP whose members below the age of 30 account
for 21% of its total membership.
10 Finally, Scottish Labour’s position over the constitutional future of Scotland has plagued
the party since the independence referendum of 2014. Scottish Labour’s participation in
the Better Together No campaign alongside the two coalition government partners at the
time will certainly have been damaging in two respects. First because it stood on the same
political platform as the Conservatives and second because of the negativity of the Better
Together campaign. Although Labour launched its own initiative, United with Labour, in a
bid to distance itself from the coalition partners, the campaign was still being led by a
senior Labour figure, Alistair Darling. It became an easy target for the SNP, which could
present the umbrella campaign as a Conservative-led initiative,  which gathered three
British rather than Scottish parties and generally defended austerity policies and welfare
cuts. It is no wonder then that a nationalist “tsunami”12 swept over the 2015 general
election with the SNP winning 56 of the 59 Scottish seats in Westminster, leaving all three
unionist parties with a single seat each. The SNP became the dominant force in Scottish
politics as it held a majority of seats in both Holyrood and Westminster.
 
Brexit and the constitutional debate
11 Indeed,  although its  outcome was  the  status  quo,  the  long independence referendum
campaign appears to have transformed Scottish politics on a much deeper level than
might have been expected. The division between the pro-independence parties led by the
SNP  within  the  Yes  campaign  and  the  three  main  unionist  parties  sharing  a  single
political  platform within  the  Better  Together  campaign has  appeared to  survive  the
referendum and created a new binary system centred along a fracture between unionists
and nationalists. The three partners of the Better Together campaign represented both
the left and right wings of the political spectrum, yet their association to represent a
common  position  within  a  single  organization  during the  independence  referendum
campaign  suggests  that  these  traditional  left/right  divisions  were  largely  made
redundant when the main issue at stake was the constitutional future of Scotland.13 This
was to be well understood by the Scottish Conservative Party in the aftermath of the 2015
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general election when it was presented with evidence at a meeting in October that the
constitutional issue could unlock many of the constituency seats it had consistently failed
to  win  during  the  last  twenty  years.  James  Kanagasooriam,  a  Populus  data-analyst,
presented his findings to the Scottish Conservative leader, Ruth Davidson, as he explained
how he  had  discovered  a  pattern  that  allowed  him to  devise  two  new measures  to
describe and analyse mathematically how people voted. These measures were broadly
defined as ‘security’ – a concept including levels of affluence, education and employment
– and ‘diversity’ – including politics of identity and measurements of how urban an area
is.  According  to  these  two  measures,  he  discovered  a  latent  line  which  separated
wealthier, more secure and less diverse Conservative voters from less affluent, less secure
but more diverse and urban Labour supporters. All voters and places on or close to the
line were to be considered as floating voters or marginal constituencies. Interestingly for
Ruth  Davidson,  Kanagasooriam’s  analysis  of  the  results  of  the  2014  independence
referendum showed that ‘temperamentally Conservative voters’ overlapped with large
numbers of No voters who backed the Union while Labour and the SNP were in a turf war
for the same voters due to a demographic overlap. His analysis thus provided evidence
that the Scottish Conservatives should run their campaigns as the “Unionist party” rather
than attempt to run on bread and butter political issues.14
12 In  the  run-up  to  the  2016  Scottish  Parliament  election  therefore,  the  Scottish
Conservative  Party  based  its  campaign  on  a  strong  unionist  message  and  fully
acknowledged  the  new  defining  divide  in  Scottish  politics  in  the  aftermath  of  the
referendum. The Scottish Conservatives chose to use the full name of the party (Scottish
Conservative and Unionist Party) to appear on their manifesto and all electoral material
rather  than  the  shorter  version  that  it  habitually  used;  the  main  headlines  of  the
manifesto were geared towards marking the party as a party of opposition against the
SNP’s independence project.15 Ruth Davidson conceded that she would not be able to win
the election and that the SNP were on course for another victory, before matching Nicola
Sturgeon’s “job application” in the SNP manifesto with her own application for the job of
opposition  leader,  thereby  clearly  positioning  itself  on  the  other  side  of  Scotland’s
constitutional divide as the voice of all unionist voters.16 The Conservatives thus made
their first electoral breakthrough at the May 2016 Scottish Parliament election, after they
obtained a total of 31 seats (with 22% of the constituency vote and 7 constituency seats,
and  22.9%  of  the  regional  vote  and  24  regional  seats),  that  is  16  more  seats  than
previously held.  Although it  represented a first  important step towards breaking the
deadlock  in  which  Scottish  Conservatives  had  been stuck  for  years,  it  was  far  from
sufficient to shake the SNP’s overall  dominance of  Scottish politics.  Ironically,  it  was
Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron’s ill-fated decision to hold a referendum
over the United Kingdom’s European membership the following month that pulled the
rug from under the nationalists’ feet.
13 Indeed, the 2016 Scottish Parliament election manifesto provided for the eventuality of a
second independence referendum after a Brexit vote as it stated that a new referendum
would be held only “if there is clear and sustained evidence that independence has become the
preferred option of a majority of the Scottish people – or if there is a significant and material
change in the circumstances that prevailed in 2014, such as Scotland being taken out of the EU
against  our  will”.17 Although  the  polls  show  no  such  surge  in  opinion  favourable  to
independence, the discrepancy between the results of the EU referendum in Scotland
(with 62% voting Remain and 38% voting Leave) and in the rest of Britain does correspond
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to the change of circumstances foreseen by the 2016 manifesto upon which the current
SNP  government  was  elected.  The  party’s  strong  results  at  the  polls  in  the  general
election of  2015 and Scottish Parliament election of  2016 certainly gave the Scottish
government a clear mandate to do so. It is no wonder then that SNP leader and First
Minister Nicola Sturgeon seized the issue of  Scotland’s membership to the EU in the
aftermath of the Brexit vote to meet with EU Council and Parliament leaders to negotiate
Scotland’s position within the EU and advance the idea of further Scottish autonomy as
regards EU membership or access to the Common Market. In December 2016, the Scottish
Government also published a White Paper setting out a very different vision of Brexit to
that set out by UK Prime Minister Theresa May, defending the idea that Scotland should
remain part of the European Single Market and continue to adhere to the EU’s provisions
on freedom of movement.18 Finally, in March 2017, Nicola Sturgeon announced that there
would be a second Scottish independence referendum due to the substantial change of
circumstances  entailed  by  Brexit.  In  her  speech  at  Saint  Andrews  House,  the  First
Minister stressed that the constitutional option which a majority of Scottish voters had
voted for in September 2014 no longer existed. Scotland could no longer be part of the UK
and the EU at the same time and a new referendum should be set up to ask people in
Scotland if they wished to be part of the UK but outside of the European Union or part of
an independent Scotland in the EU. Both the constitutional and European issues were
therefore  presented as  entirely  wedded and inseparable  from each other,  with  little
concern given to the fact that Scots may not weigh the issues of EU membership and
independence equally. 
14 The Scottish Social Attitudes Survey of 2016 did ask respondents how likely they were to
vote in a future independence referendum (Indyref2) and coupled it with the ways in
which  both  the  SNP  and  the  Conservatives  in  particular  linked  it  to  Brexit.  In  his
statistical analysis, McCrone set out the Brexit vote among three variables (libertarian-
authoritarian values; Indyref2 and education) and found that those who were most likely
to have voted Remain in Scotland (as  many as 96%) were the most  highly educated,
libertarian and intending Yes voters at a second independence referendum, that is the
“core of ‘progressive’ opinion in Scotland”.19 It appears that having libertarian rather
than authoritarian views gave a major boost to voting Remain, but that education also
mattered as among would-be Yes voters there were more Remain voters with either
libertarian (96%) or authoritarian (62%) views. 
15 Paradoxically, the survey also showed that although people are more likely to vote Yes at
a second independence referendum if  they are libertarian,  voted Remain and have a
degree, they are also more likely to vote Yes if they have no educational qualifications
and voted Leave. This would provide evidence that the relationship between the way
people voted at the European referendum of June 2016 and the way they would vote at a
second independence referendum is not as straightforward as it would appear. Indeed, a
YouGov poll of January 2017 showed that despite the SNP’s advocacy of ‘independence in
Europe’, Brexit significantly divides the nationalist movement as it found that only 65% of
Yes voters who backed Leave said they would back independence again. While some Yes
voters may accept that the September 2014 referendum was a ‘once in a generation’
event,  others  may  want  the  First  Minister  to  wait  longer  before  holding  a  second
referendum in order to ensure a Yes majority. Finally, some Yes supporters who voted to
leave the EU may be opposed to an early ballot as they wish Scotland to be taken out of
the institution by the UK government before the country claims its independence. Nearly
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a third of Yes voters at the 2014 referendum and an estimated 36% of SNP voters voted
Leave at  the  EU referendum,  which undermines  Nicola Sturgeon’s  case  for  a  second
independence ballot and points to the divisions within the nationalist movement about
the merits of EU membership. 
16 Moreover, the Scottish Government’s “Scotland’s Place in Europe” white paper, published
in December 2016, outlines a very different vision of Brexit than the one proposed by the
British Government. Throughout this document, the Scottish Government expresses its
belief that, short of full EU membership, the “least worst outcome for the UK as a whole”
would be to retain full membership of the European Single Market through the European
Economic Area (EEA) and to remain in the Customs Union. However, recent polls have
shown that contrary to what the EU referendum results in Scotland may suggest, the
views expressed by the Scottish Parliament in its white paper are often at odds with those
held by a majority of Scots.20 While support for free trade does indeed appear universal
with as many as 93% of people expressing the belief that EU companies should be able to
trade freely in Britain while British companies should be able to do the same within the
EU, there is widespread support for curbing freedom of movement. Indeed, almost two
thirds of Scots (64%) think that people who wish to move to Britain from the EU should
have to apply to do so in the same way as non-EU migrants should have to do, against a
mere 22% opposed to that idea. Opinion therefore is only slightly more liberal than it is
across  Britain  as  a  whole  on  this  issue  where  the  percentage  of  people  opposed  to
freedom of movement was 68%. As might be expected, fewer Remain voters in Scotland
are opposed to freedom of movement than Leave voters, yet still over half of Remain
voters (53%) are in favour of making EU nationals apply to move to Britain. This explains
why there is so little support for freedom of movement north of the border even though
Scotland voted so strongly to Remain. These statistics therefore point to the fact that the
SNP’s stance on Europe and Brexit is at odds with part of the Scottish electorate. 
17 Although it did not focus only on the SNP’s independence in Europe objective or on the
issue of a second referendum, Nicola Sturgeon’s campaign was therefore overshadowed
by the European question and divided her electorate. On the other hand, the Scottish
Conservatives  were  able  to  take  full  advantage  of  the  fact  that  their  party  were
negotiating  a  Brexit  deal  for  the  UK,  while  their  leader,  whose  personal  popularity
outstrips  that  of  her  party,  repeatedly  stated  her  preference  for  a  soft  Brexit  while
making opposition to a second referendum the leitmotiv of her campaign. It is therefore
unsurprising that the Conservative resurgence in Scotland at the June general election
occurred predominantly amongst those who voted No in 2014, wining as much as 44% of
the vote among this group (up 17 points since 2015), well ahead of Labour’s 36% whose
more uncertain message on the constitutional issue has failed to make it profitable in
terms of vote. Crucially, the Scottish Conservatives picked up 8% of the vote among those
who voted Yes,  that  is  5% more than in 2015.  This  progression among Yes voters  is
accounted for by the number of Leave voters among them. Indeed, just over one in five
(21%) of those who voted Yes and Leave voted for the Scottish Conservatives in June 2017.
Drawing from  the  soundbite  devised  by  Theresa  May  after  Nicola  Sturgeon’s  shock
announcement of a second referendum – ‘now is not the time’ –, Ruth Davidson therefore
clipped  the  wings  of  the  nationalists  as  she  argued  that  an  anticipated  second
independence referendum would be unfair to voters as they would not be given sufficient
time to make an informed decision. 
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Rising from the ashes: Scotland’s Conservative
phoenix
18 The Scottish Conservatives were able to start their campaign with confidence. First, they
had little to lose but their single seat in Westminster, in David Mundell’s constituency of
Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale and Tweedale. This seemed all the more unlikely as the results
of the local government elections, which had been held only eight weeks earlier, were
particularly encouraging: the party had consolidated its position by obtaining over 100
council seats with a high number of first preference votes for Conservative candidates in
target seats for the general election. Moreover, the Scottish Conservatives were ready for
battle as they had quietly been selecting and placing candidates in their key target seats
over the previous six months. Indeed, the Scottish Conservatives’ preparedness for the
snap election was immediately visible as they immediately started putting up posters,
leafleting and door-to-door canvassing while the other parties were left scrambling to
respond to Theresa May’s surprise announcement.
19 Ruth  Davidson  was  also  able  to  remain  immune  from  the  increasing  chaos  of  the
Conservative campaign south of the border. Theresa May’s tightly controlled appearances
and uneasiness when meeting ordinary members of the public, her decision not to meet
the bereaved inhabitants of Grenfell tower immediately or to take part in head-to-head
television  debates,  did  little  to  dispel  the  impression  that  the  Prime  Minister  was
disconnected from ordinary people. Besides, many of her key pledges, such as scrapping
the ‘triple lock’ on pensions, means-testing the Winter Fuel Payment, ending free school
lunches for all  infants and replacing them with free breakfasts,  reforming social care
funding so that £100.000 of pensioners’ assets were protected (but including their home
in the calculation) and holding a free vote in Parliament on fox hunting, were damaging
to her campaign. Her U-turn on social care reform (dubbed the “Dementia Tax” in the
press) finally demolished the strong and stable image she had attempted to build at the
outset of the campaign. In contrast, Ruth Davidson was hailed as a “genuine” leader,21
“far from the traditional image of a twinset and pearls Tory”,22 drawing both strength and
popularity from her strong sense of humour, comprehensive education and Protestant
middle-class background. With her personal popularity far outstripping that of the Prime
Minister, she took full advantage of the prominence of the Scottish broadcast bulletins
and print media to become the public face of the campaign in Scotland.
20 General  elections  are  paradoxical  in  Scotland  insofar  as  much  of  the  policy  agenda
matters little because much of it is devolved and part of the Scottish Parliament’s remit.
The controversies over Theresa May’s manifesto thus had little resonance in Scotland
where  the  Scottish  Tory  leader  was  able  to  argue  that  it  did  not  concern  Scotland.
Besides, May’s most controversial policy on social care was in fact more generous than
the existing system in Scotland: while Scotland does provide free social care to the elderly
in their own homes, only £26,000 of pensioners’ assets are protected when they go into
residential care. It was in none of the main Scottish parties’ interests to explain how
much more generous the UK Prime Minister’s proposal was, and the issue was therefore
absent from the Scottish campaign. Moreover, the Scottish Conservatives had already
declared themselves opposed to any changes to fox-hunting rules in Scotland and were
able to exploit a grey area over which welfare policies were devolved to Scotland to rule
out any cuts to winter fuel allowances in their manifesto.
The 2017 General Election in Scotland: a Return to Multi-party Politics?
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXIII-2 | 2018
8
21 With all potentially explosive issues contained, Ruth Davidson was able to concentrate on
the  constitutional  issue.  Although  she  did  have  seven  years  of  Tory  government  in
Westminster to defend and was virulently attacked over her party’s decision to introduce
the so-called ‘rape clause’,23 Ruth Davidson relentlessly pursued her winning strategy of
2016 by condemning Nicola Sturgeon’s plans for a second independence referendum and
presenting  her  party  as  a  strong  opposition  party.  Launching  her  general  election
campaign, she declared: 
Across Scotland, we know people are looking for somebody to stand up to the SNP.
So our challenge is this. It’s to bring the SNP down to size. To show they can’t take
Scotland for granted.24
22 By doing so,  she was positioning herself  among a majority of  Scots  and also “subtly
inferring  that  Sturgeon  was  out  of  touch,  separated  from  reality  and  hell-bent  on
pursuing  separation regardless  of public  opinion”.25 In  fact,  all  opposition parties  in
Scotland  played  upon  this  idea  to  attack  the  nationalists’  record  in  government,
suggesting that the SNP was failing to govern due to its obsessive planning for a second
referendum. The attacks on the nationalists’ handling of the education system or Police
Scotland, for instance, paradoxically turned the 2017 general election campaign into a
much more Holyrood-oriented political debate. The strategy was not to the taste of the
Conservative leadership in London, however,  as they felt  that Ruth Davidson did not
deliver on the ‘strong and stable’ campaign message that they had set out to develop
nationally in order to make of the 2017 general election one that focused on the Prime
Minister’s persona and which would strengthen her hand to deliver Brexit. Five weeks
before polling day, Ruth Davidson was therefore summoned to London by May’s Scottish-
born campaign manager, Fiona Hill, where she argued her case and pleaded for Populus’
involvement.
23 Returning  to  Scotland  with  the  funds  she  needed,  the  Scottish  Conservative  leader
immediately  launched a  targeted social  media  campaign tailored to  differentiate  the
different target voters:  SNP Leavers,  Lib-Dem ‘cultural Tories’  and Labour Unionists.26
Canvassing data was constantly fed into the Populus model during the campaign while
the Conservative campaign poured its funds and efforts into winning the constituencies
which appeared on Kanagasooriam’s “latent line”. The Scottish Conservatives targeted
little more than thirteen key seats, many of which were in north-east of Scotland, such as
Aberdeen South, West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine, and Banff and Buchan, where the
Tories had performed well in 2016 and which were also strong Leave areas in the EU
referendum. It was hoped that the Borders area where David Mundell also had a seat
would enable the party to perform well, as well as Perthshire, another strong Leave area
with historic Conservative support. Finally, the Scottish Conservatives led a bitter fight in
the constituencies of Moray and Gordon, respectively held by SNP Westminster leader
Angus Robertson and former SNP First Minister Alex Salmond and managed to snatch
victory from the jaws of defeat. 
 
Conclusion
24 In  the  end,  all  but  one  of  the  seats  on  Populus’  “latent  line”  fell  to  the  Scottish
Conservatives. Yet the strong majority Theresa May had hoped for when she called for a
snap election, and which would give her the mandate she needed to pursue her ‘vision of
Brexit’, failed to materialise. The outcome was a reduced Conservative majority and the
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formation of a minority government after an agreement with the DUP. While the Tories
licked their wounds south of the border, Ruth Davidson’s Scottish Conservatives won 12
extra seats in Scotland and held on to the one they had previously. It was quite a feat in a
country where Conservative MPs had long been wiped out of the map and it was all the
more extraordinary because all  of the Scottish seats won in 2017 were seized from a
heretofore  hegemonic  SNP.  The  vote  was  widely  considered  as  a  rebuke  of  Nicola
Sturgeon’s calls for a second referendum: although it was unlikely that the SNP would
manage to hold on to all of its 54 seats, there was little to suggest that the scale of their
defeat  would  be  that  formidable.  The  2017  general  election results  halted  the  SNP’s
momentum for independence - as the First Minister conceded that she would have to
postpone  her  plans  for  an  early  independence  referendum -  and put  an  end to  the
nationalists’ domination of Scottish politics, ushering in a new multi-party polity split
along an ever deeper constitutional divide.
25 Fiona Simpkins is a Senior Lecturer in British contemporary history and politics at
the Université Lumière of Lyon (Lyon 2). Her main areas of research are devolution,
Scottish politics and the constitutional debate in Scotland.
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ABSTRACTS
Although Scotland had long been a Labour stronghold, devolution soon appeared to have served
as a political platform for the nationalists who were able to assert their domination of Scottish
politics after they obtained both an overall majority of seats in Holyrood in 2011 and 56 out of 59
Scottish seats at Westminster in 2015. Scotland had become a dominant-party polity and the SNP
the  third  biggest  party  in  Britain.  However,  the  June  2017 general  election  appears  to  have
seriously dented the SNP’s electoral prospects and has corresponded not only to the unexpected
resurgence of  Conservatism in  Scotland but  also  to  a  new surge in  Labour votes.  It  appears
evident  that  the  Brexit  vote  following  the  European  referendum  of  June  2016,  which  has
dominated the British political debate since then, has had a profound impact on Scottish politics.
This paper therefore seeks to examine Scotland’s return to multi-party politics in light of the
twin  impact  of  Brexit  and  the  constitutional  issue  on  the  2017  general  election  results  in
Scotland.
Bien que l’Ecosse ait longtemps été un bastion travailliste,  la dévolution y servit de tremplin
électoral  pour les nationalistes en ce qu’ils  parvinrent rapidement à dominer entièrement le
paysage politique écossais en obtenant une majorité absolue des sièges au Parlement écossais dès
2011 avant de remporter 56 des 59 sièges écossais  à  Westminster en 2015.  L’Ecosse fut  alors
caractérisée par un système à parti dominant et le SNP devint le troisième parti du Royaume-Uni.
Néanmoins,  les  élections  législatives  de  juin  2017  ébranlèrent  la  domination  électorale  des
nationalistes écossais en ce qu’elles produisirent non seulement une résurgence inattendue des
conservateurs mais aussi une progression du vote travailliste. Le processus du Brexit, suite au
référendum de juin 2016 sur l’adhésion du Royaume-Uni à l’Union Européenne, qui a dominé le
débat politique depuis lors, semble ainsi avoir profondément transformé les enjeux politiques en
Ecosse. Il s’agira dès lors d’analyser le double impact de la question constitutionnelle et du Brexit
sur les résultats des élections législatives britanniques de juin 2017 en Ecosse et un retour vers un
système politique multipartite.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Brexit, élections législatives britanniques 2017, politique écossaise, parti
conservateur écossais, parti travailliste écossais, SNP, dévolution, référendum sur l’indépendance
de l’Ecosse
Keywords: Brexit, general elections 2017, Scottish politics, Scottish Conservative Party, Scottish
Labour Party, SNP, devolution, Scottish independence referendum
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